It’s one thing to say that the individual prosecutors shouldn’t/can’t be personally liable. Viewed in isolation, the Supreme Court’s rationale in a line of cases (not just the 1976 decision cited by Brayton) makes sense: We don’t want prosecutors shying away from tough cases because they might have to spend time defending against a torrent of dubious claims in close call (or not so close call) cases later. The problem, as usual, is that “viewed in isolation” is absolutely, positively the wrong way to look at the situation.

The US system is almost unique in the amount of protection it provides for governmental bodies against being later held accountable. A wide variety of immunity provisions acts to prevent private citizens from getting damages from government bodies for mere violations of civil rights. For example, states — and subordinate units of states, such as the typical county DA’s office — cannot be sued for damages under the 11th Amendment. And all of those famous cases involving prisoners suing to be released for wrongful convictions have two people being named across the v.… because one must sue the actual custodian (the warden, usually), not the “system.”

It’s a system that only Joseph K. could love. Or understand. But it beats the alternative: In civil law countries (e.g., most of Europe), there’s no remedy of any kind at all, other than an unappealable administrative claim to be made without the benefit of discovery against the government for “compensation” under a very strict, mechanical standard.

And hiding behind all of this is the question of who is really responsible, anyway; a wrongful conviction is never the result of a single actor’s animus — it’s a team effort.